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The introductory phase of the European Monetary Union (EMU)
ended with the introduction of the euro currency in 2002. We 
present a review of the experiences with the new monetary union.
Using a Taylor rule, we analyze the conduct of monetary policy by
the European Central Bank (ECB). The empirical results suggest
that the ECB applies similar weights to inflation and the output
gap as the Bundesbank in the past, but more than proportionate
weight to economic developments in Germany and France. Next, we
show that the link between monetary developments and inflation in
the euro area is empirically very stable. ECB monetary policy was
too loose in the first four years to keep inflation below the ECB’s
upper limit of 2 percent defining price stability. In the last section,
we analyze the fiscal framework of EMU and show that it has not 
succeeded in safeguarding fiscal discipline, especially in the large
member states. 
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The creation of a monetary union in Europe on January 1, 1999 was the capstone 
of the “Maastricht Process,” which shaped the monetary and fiscal policies of 
the countries striving for membership in European Monetary Union (EMU) 
over much of the 1990s.
1 EMU started with the conversion of the national 
currencies of the member states into euros and the beginning of the operations of 
the new Euro System, the new European Central Bank (ECB), and the national 
central banks of the participating states (NCBs).
2 Interbank and most non-cash 
payments have been denominated in euros since the start, and European financial 
markets quickly adopted the euro as the unit of account. The replacement of 
the national currency signs by euro cash at the start of 2002 completed the initial
phase of EMU.
EMU has changed the framework for monetary and fiscal policy in Europe. All
EMU member states now participate in a common monetary policy, which is under
the control of the ECB. In addition, EMU sets up a framework for fiscal policy in
Europe with rules for public-sector deficits and debts and processes guiding and
monitoring the budgetary policies of the member states. This framework was created
to assure fiscal discipline in EMU and to prevent the stability of the common 
currency from being undermined by mounting public-sector debts. 
Now that the initial phase of EMU is over, this paper reviews the experience with
monetary and fiscal policies in the first years of EMU. In Section II, we provide some
institutional background. In Section III, we discuss the ECB’s monetary policy. In
Section IV, we look at the evolution of monetary conditions in the euro economy
and assess the central bank’s policy on that basis. Section V discusses fiscal policy in
EMU, and Section VI concludes.
II. Institutional Background
The Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 and the Amsterdam
Treaty of 1997) provides the institutional framework for EMU and the ECB. It
requires that the NCBs of all participating states be politically independent. The ECB
is similarly independent from the governments of the member states and the political
bodies of the European Union (EU). The ECB is owned by the NCBs. Its name,
European Central Bank, is actually a euphemism, since the ECB is not a “bank,” as a
look at its balance sheet reveals. Like the Federal Reserve Board of Governors in the
United States, the ECB is the central decision-making institution within the Euro
System, and like the Board of Governors, it relies on others to implement monetary
policy actions. Unlike the Board of Governors, these “others” are all rather than one of
the participating NCBs.
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1. For a review of fiscal policies in the EMU member states during the 1990s, see Hughes Hallett et al. (2001).
2. In addition to the Euro system, there is also the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), which consists of the
ECB and the NCBs of the EU member states.The Maastricht Treaty delegates the common monetary policy to the Euro System
and gives the ECB the task of executing it (Art. 3 and 5 of the Statutes of the ESCB).
Monetary policy decisions are made by the Governing Council (Council, for short)
whose members are the NCB presidents and the six members of the ECB Board.
3
Formally, Council decisions are taken by majority vote, with each member having
one vote and the ECB president a second one in the case of a tie. In practice, deci-
sions commonly seem to be carried by consensus, i.e., a broad majority of the
Council members.
4
The Treaty mandates that the ECB regard price stability as the principal objective
of monetary policy. The ECB defines price stability as an average rate of inflation
below 2 percent in the medium run. The principal mandate is qualified (Art. 105(1))
by the call to support the general economic policies in the European Community as
long as this does not compromise the goal of price stability. Issing et al. (2001)
explain that the ECB does not interpret this as saying that output stabilization is a
secondary goal for monetary policy.
Fiscal policy in the EU and EMU is subject to the strictures of the Excessive
Deficit Procedure (EDP), which was part of the Maastricht Treaty, and the Stability
and Growth Pact (SGP), which was partly introduced with the 1997 Amsterdam
Treaty and is partly based on simple EU legislation.
5 The Maastricht Treaty uncondi-
tionally obliges EMU member states to avoid excessive deficits. Whether or not a
country has an excessive deficit is determined by the ECB Council based on an
assessment procedure, which is triggered when the country has a public-sector deficit
larger than 3 percent of GDP or a public debt larger than 60 percent of GDP. Under
the EDP, countries with an excessive deficit can be admonished, secretly or openly, 
by the European Council and, if the deficit is not sufficiently corrected, they can be
subject to financial fines. During the 1990s, the EDP carried another penalty for
excessive deficits, viz. the threat of being denied entry to the monetary union, which
was reserved for states without excessive deficits. Beyond that, the SGP obliges EMU
member states to keep their public-sector budgets close to balance or in surplus. The
member states have to present annual Stability Programs that spell out their fiscal 
targets for the coming years and explain how they intend to reach these targets. 
All member states are expected to have reached balanced budgets by the year 2004.
The essential goal of the fiscal strictures is to stabilize the public debt ratios 
of EMU member states and to reduce them where this is deemed necessary. Low 
and stable debt ratios are perceived as essential preconditions for the stability of 
the common currency. Economic reasoning and historical experience confirm this
view. It is one way to express the governments’ intertemporal budget constraint,
which says that, ultimately, public-sector deficits must be backed by future surpluses.
An obvious practical difficulty with this concept, however, is how to translate the
intertemporal budget constraint, which is essentially a long-run constraint, into
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3. The president of the European Council and a member of the European Commission have the right to participate
in ECB Council meetings. 
4. For a discussion of voting rules on the central bank council of monetary unions, see von Hagen and Süppel (1994),
Dornbuschet al. (1998), and von Hagen (1999a), who discusses the role of consensus voting in that context.
5. For a detailed description of the EDP and the SGP, see Buti and Sapir (1998).meaningful constraints on year-to-year fiscal policies (Perotti et al. [1998]). Focusing
on the long run alone, the intertemporal budget constraint has no practical implica-
tions for the short run, as governments can always promise future surpluses to excuse
current deficits. The role of the annual deficit constraint in the EDP and SGP is to
create the necessary link between the long and the short run. As we will see below,
however, focusing too much on the annual deficit may undermine the credibility of
the procedures, because the resulting constraints may keep countries from adopting
policies that would violate the deficit constraint initially but help reduce public debt
in the medium and long run.
III. Monetary Policy in EMU
The ECB’s monetary policy evolves within a “two-pillar” strategy.
6 The focal point 
of the first pillar is a “reference value” for the annual growth rate of a broad monetary
aggregate, M3. The reference value is derived from a simple quantity equation of
money. The second pillar consists of an analysis of short-run price movements using
a broad collection of data and a broad menu of alternative models. The ECB insists
that the strategy is neither “monetary targeting” in a narrow sense of following a fixed
money growth rule, nor “inflation targeting” in the sense of trying to achieve a given
target rate of inflation over a specified time horizon. Instead, the two pillars serve to
organize monetary policy debates. The role of the first pillar is to focus attention on
the medium- and long-run consequences of monetary policy. In this regard, the
ECB’s strategy resembles the Bundesbank’s earlier practice of monetary targeting (von
Hagen [1999b]). Short of an explicit intermediate target of monetary policy, the
ECB’s policy is best judged on the basis of its main policy instrument, the interest
rate on its main repo operations.
Many observers had expected the ECB to start its monetary policy by pushing up
interest rates to prove that it was hard-nosed on inflation (e.g., Dornbusch et al.
[1998]). The opposite happened. In a concerted step generally considered the Euro
System’s first policy action, all NCBs reduced their interest rates to 3 percent on
December 3, 1998.
7 On April 9, 1999, the ECB cut its interest rate to 2.5 percent.
This was a surprising move, as most EMU economies were already recovering 
from the economic crisis in late 1998.
8 The ECB reversed its course in November
1999. Its interest rate peaked at 4.75 percent in October 2000. On May 11, 2001,
the ECB started to cut its interest rate. After September 11, it lowered its 
interest rate in two steps of 50 basis points each. Table 1 reports the ECB’s interest
rate policy since 1999. The table shows that the ECB now has almost completed one
full interest rate cycle.
126 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/DECEMBER 2002
6. For a detailed discussion of the strategy, see von Hagen and Brückner (2002).
7. The Bank of Italy cut its rate to 3.5 percent and to 3.0 percent later that month. See Gaspar (2001) for a review of
this action.
8. Gaspar (2001) explains that move as a protection against deflationary risks in the euro area, although signs of
inflation creeping up already existed.Taylor rules have become a popular tool for describing and interpreting central
bank interest rate policies under very diverse circumstances. The simple Taylor 
rule (Taylor [1993]) found empirical support for the euro area already before the 
introduction of the euro (see, e.g., Gerlach and Schnabel [2000]). In view of that, 
it has received considerable attention as a benchmark for the ECB’s actual policy.
9
Of course, we are fully aware of the fact that the ECB, like all central banks, has 
repeatedly affirmed that it does not follow a Taylor rule, and we do not want to suggest
that it blindly applies a technical relationship. Nevertheless, Taylor rules are a useful
device to summarize empirically observed patterns of central bank policy. Here, we 
follow the same approach. We base our exercise on the following specification: 
it = 4.0 + 1.2(π t –π
ob) + 0.2yt, (1)
where it, π t, π
ob, and yt denote the main repo rate, the inflation rate, the inflation
objective, and the output gap, respectively. We set π
ob= 1.5 percent, the value implic-
itly used by the ECB for its calculation of the reference value for M3, and assume an
equilibrium interest rate of 4.0 percent, the sum of the ECB’s assumed long-run real
GDP growth rate and the inflation objective. Since the measurement of the output
gap is particularly uncertain for the euro area due to data problems, we use a simple
average of the estimates provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD [2002]), the International Monetary Fund (IMF [2002]),
and the European Commission (EU [2001]) to obtain a robust measure.
The coefficients of the Taylor rule in equation (1) are chosen to resemble empiri-
cal estimates for the Bundesbank prior to EMU, a plausible benchmark for the ECB
(e.g., Faust et al. [2001]). This parameterization was also used in our previous study
(von Hagen and Brückner [2002]), allowing for a simple robustness check of earlier
results. One advantage is that this parameterization yields a value of the Taylor rule
for the euro area of 3 percent in December 1998, which corresponds to the actual
value at the start of EMU. We prefer to impose such a plausible parameterization to
estimating it, because the short time span does not allow obtaining of estimates that
are robust against changes in the number of data points or changes in the series used
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9. See Peersman and Smets (1999), Taylor (1998), Alesina et al. (2001), Faust et al. (2001), and von Hagen and
Brückner (2002) as well as the financial press, e.g., Financial Times Deutschland.
Table 1  ECB Interest Rate Policy
Date Interest rate (percent) Date Interest rate (percent)
Jan. 1, 1999 3.00 Sep. 1, 2000 4.50
Apr. 9, 1999 2.50 Oct. 6, 2000 4.75
Nov. 5, 1999 3.00 May 11, 2001 4.50
Feb. 2, 2000 3.25 Aug. 31, 2001 4.25
Mar. 17, 2000 3.50 Sep. 18, 2001 3.75
Apr. 28, 2000 3.75 Nov. 9, 2001 3.25
June 9, 2000 4.25
Source: European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, various issues.to obtain EMU-wide output gaps. In contrast to Faust et al. (2001), we concentrate
on Taylor rules based on the current rather than on an expected future inflation 
rate. The main reason is that calculating expected inflation rates from the data 
would force us to shorten the sample. As we show below, this does not change the
results significantly.
10
In Figure 1, we plot the Taylor rule from equation (1), labeled “euro,” together
with the ECB’s main policy instrument (“main rate”). The figure shows that the ECB
kept its interest rate well below the benchmark from January 1999. If the benchmark
reflects what the Bundesbank would have done under similar circumstances, the 
figure suggests that the ECB’s monetary policy was consistently less tight than
Bundesbank policy would have been. Note that the difference between the actual rate
and the benchmark is not well explained by interest rate smoothing. With interest
rate smoothing, the actual rate would adjust to the rate implied by the Taylor rule
gradually, i.e., 
it = λ it– 1+ (1 – λ )(4.0 + 1.2(π t –π
ob) + 0.2yt), (2)
where λ > 0. Figure 1, however, shows that the actual rate and the rate calculated
from our Taylor rule move in opposite directions in at least two instances. 
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10. The alternative way to proceed in the analysis would be to use EMU data for inflation and output gaps and 
the ECB’s interest rate and estimate the coefficients. Empirical studies doing this find a smaller coefficient 
on inflation and a larger coefficient on the output gap, suggesting that the ECB places more weight on output
stabilization and less on combating inflation than the Bundesbank did in the past (e.g., Neumann [2002]). Our
procedure thus implicitly assumes that the ECB resembles the Bundesbank more strongly in its relative weights
on output and inflation.How can the difference between the actual rate and the benchmark be explained?
It is sometimes argued that the ECB cares about (or should care about) core inflation
instead of headline inflation. In Figure 2, we show a Taylor rule with core inflation
replacing headline inflation. Core inflation is measured by excluding food and energy
prices from the consumer price index (CPI) (“core 1”). This rule does not describe
the ECB’s policy better than the benchmark. Since core inflation rose slowly but
steadily over most of the period under consideration, a Taylor rule based on core
inflation captures neither the tightening of monetary policy in 2000 nor the easing in
late 2001. A variant of this core inflation rule is to increase the weight on the output
gap. This follows the conjecture by Faust et al. (2001), namely, that the ECB places
more weight on output stabilization than the Bundesbank did. Assuming a weight 
of 0.8 for output yields the rate labeled “core 2” in Figure 2. It describes the ECB’s
policy quite well until early 2000, even though it does not explain the low interest
rates between April and October 1999. As the first Taylor rule based on core 
inflation, it does not capture the behavior of the interest rate from spring 2000
onward. We conclude that the ECB does not aim at stabilizing core inflation. This is
consistent with recent results reported by Begg et al. (2002).
11
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11. In contrast, a former version of the CEPR Report, Alesina et al. (2001), claims that a core-inflation based Taylor
rule performs well in describing ECB monetary policy.















































































































































































































Core 1 Main rate Core 2
An alternative explanation is based on the decision-making structure in the ECB. 
If ECB Council decisions were taken by simple majority, the median NCB president
would have considerable influence on them. This is important, because national 
inflation rates in the EMU exhibited quite a large degree of cross-country variationduring the period under consideration.
12 Under majority voting on the ECB Council,
significant inflation differentials could move the ECB’s interest rate away from the
benchmark. To evaluate this possibility, we calculate Taylor rules based on equation 
(1) using individual country data, and compute the median Taylor rule for each
period.
13 In Figure 3, we plot this rate, labeled “median.” The median rule would have
implied a much faster and larger rise in interest rates in 1999 and especially 2000.
Thus, Figure 3 suggests that the median NCB president does not play a large role in
shaping interest rate decisions. This is consistent with the view, often given by the ECB
president in his press statements, that council decisions are based on consensus.
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12. The largest inflation differential across countries started at 2.4 percent in January 1999. After falling to 2 percent
at the end of 1999, it jumped to 4.1 percent in January 2000. Since then, it has remained above 3 percent most
of the time.
13. Theoretically, it would be interesting to estimate country-specific coefficients of the Taylor rule. However, as the
voting behavior of the Council members is not released, we cannot estimate such national preference parameters.
















































































































































































































Median D-F Main rate
Percent
A third possible explanation for the difference between the benchmark and the
actual ECB policy is that the ECB Council pays particular attention to the economic
situation of the two largest economies, Germany and France. To explore this, we
average the rates calculated from equation (1) for these two countries. The resulting
rate, labeled “D-F,” is shown in Figure 3. It does more to explain the actual interest
rate than the original Taylor rule (“euro”). Interestingly, the ECB’s first interest rate
move in April 1999 pushed the actual rate closer to the “D-F” rate. The subsequent
movements in the actual rate seem quite consistent with a smooth adjustment of 
the actual rate to that implied by “D-F.” Thus, the evidence supports the idea that
the ECB Council places more weight on the economic developments in Germany
and France. Like all other benchmarks considered so far, the “D-F” rule would havecalled for a tighter monetary policy in the beginning of 2002 due to the jump in 
the inflation rate. However, most recently actual interest rates and the “D-F” rule 
coincide again.
For a more formal test, we regress the actual interest rate on the rate predicted 
by the D-F rule (Table 2). All data are monthly. The sample period starts in
November 1998. By including the lagged main rate, we allow for interest rate
smoothing, which is significant empirically. The first regression has the actual rate
depend on its own lag and the Taylor rule for Germany and France. The table shows
that this model explains the actual rate very well. Adding one of our two “core” 
variables, or measures of the Taylor rule for the euro-area countries except Germany
and France, leads to statistically insignificant coefficients. The estimates are very 
similar to, and not statistically different from, those obtained by von Hagen and
Brückner (2002) for the period until June 2001. This indicates that the ECB’s 
pattern of setting interest rates is quite stable.
131
Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the European Monetary Union
14. We would like to thank Nigel Jenkinson for suggesting this possible explanation.
Table 2  Estimated Interest Rate Rules
(1) (2)
Constant 0.03 (0.22) –0.31 (–1.65)
D-F 0.13 (2.58)
D-F+6 0.15 (3.48)
Lagged main rate 0.85 (14.33) 0.91 (21.75)





Note: ρ is the first-order residual autocorrelation. Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios.
The second regression is based on a forward-looking Taylor rule. It uses expecta-
tions of inflation and output gaps six months ahead, proxied by their actual future
observations. Thus, the regression runs from November 1998 to October 2001. Due
to the short time span, we did not estimate this equation by GMM but by standard
OLS. We see that the coefficients are similar and the total fit slightly better. 
In sum, it appears that predominant influence of the economic situation in
Germany and France on the ECB’s policy is a relatively robust finding. There are 
several possible explanations for this. It may reflect the acknowledgment of the other
ECB Council members of the importance of these two countries for European 
integration. Alternatively, it may reflect a shared view of the ECB Council that these
two economies, which together represent half of the euro economy, represent the
medium-run developments of the euro area better than aggregate euro-area data used
to compute the euro-area Taylor rule. Whether or not that is true is an empirical
question that remains to be resolved. It could also be that the ECB uses German and
French data as a proxy for EMU-wide aggregates, because data in these countries are
released considerably earlier.
14 Finally, note that Taylor rules computed individually
for Germany and France evolved quite similarly during this period, as Germany hadlower inflation rates but also a lower output gap than France. It remains an interest-
ing question how ECB monetary policy might react when the German and the
French economies call for interest rates moving in opposite directions. 
IV. Monetary Relations in the Euro Area
In this section, we review the development of the relationship between money and
prices in the euro area. First, we look at broad money and inflation since November
1998 onward. Next, we estimate a long-run money demand function and use it to
develop a model for the long-run equilibrium price level. We then show that this
model has considerable predictive power for price level movements in the euro area. 
A. Monetary Developments and Inflation
Measuring money growth is a difficult issue in EMU. The ECB’s key monetary
aggregate, M3, consists of cash, overnight deposits, deposits with fixed maturities of
up to two years, deposits with statutory maturity of up to three months, repurchase
agreements of financial institutions, money market fund shares, money market paper,
bank certificates of deposit, and short-term obligations of maturities up to two 
years. Some of these elements are denominated in non-euro currencies, and others are
traded in secondary markets. These elements are subject to valuation changes as their
market prices change. In calculating the monthly growth rate of M3, the ECB purges
the monetary data from these valuation changes. The ECB’s reasoning behind this is 
that changes in monetary assets caused by valuation changes rather than transactions
do not cause portfolio adjustments and changes in private spending behavior 
(ECB [2001]), and therefore have no implications for inflation. The empirical
strength of this conjecture, which is not in line with standard portfolio choice 
models, remains unclear. 
A second issue is that the ECB’s original aggregate contained liabilities of 
euro-area financial institutions against non-banks residing outside the euro area.
Noting that these liabilities were growing relatively fast from January 2000 onward,
and very much so in early 2001, the ECB decided to redefine its aggregate excluding
all liabilities against non-euro area residents. This introduces a potential measure-
ment bias, however, as the relevant liabilities are not statistically measured in all 
euro-area countries. Unfortunately, the ECB has suppressed the publication of the
earlier series, so that an assessment of its claim that this is a more relevant measure 
of “money” is impossible.
In Figure 4, we plot three measures of annual M3 growth rates. All three are
adjusted for the reference value of 4.5 percent. Following ECB practice, they are 
calculated as centered three-month moving averages. The line labeled “ECB index” is
the ECB’s official money growth statistic. It shows money growth being roughly in
line with the reference value at the start of EMU. The official money growth rate rose
continually from the start of EMU to peak at about 2 percentage points above the
reference value in April 2000. This confirms our earlier impression of a monetary
policy stance that was too easy during 1999 and 2000. The official growth rate fell
132 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/DECEMBER 2002back to reach the reference value in early 2001. With the renewed easing of monetary
policy starting in May 2001, however, money growth accelerated again. Note that
money growth accelerated faster in the period between May and September 2001
than afterward. This is in contrast with popular suggestions that money growth 
accelerated due to an increase in the precautionary demand for money following the
terrorist attacks of September 11. Money growth as measured by the ECB stood at
7.4 percent in spring of 2002.
The measure of money growth labeled “M3 growth less reference value” is calcu-
lated from the end-of-period balance sheet data in the ECB’s monthly report. This
series can be calculated only until May 2001 for lack of published data from then on.
Between the start of EMU and early 2001, this growth rate is continually above the
ECB’s official gauge of money growth. This is to be expected, since the euro tended
to depreciate against the dollar during this period and the ECB’s adjustment of 
monetary figures for exchange rate changes biases the measurement of money growth
downward under such circumstances. Judged on this basis, money growth peaked at
3.5 percent above the reference value and started to slow later than shown by the 
official measure. It reached the reference value in May 2001. One implication is that
monetary policy was considerably more expansionary in 1999–2000 than the ECB
conceded in its own measurement. A second implication is that the amount of 
monetary tightening—expressed in the decline of money growth rates—applied
between April 2000 and May 2001 was considerably larger than the ECB’s own
money growth figures revealed. Monetary policy may thus have contributed more to
the slowdown of the EMU economy in 2001 than the official figures suggest.
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M3 new less reference value
M3 growth less reference value
ECB index
PercentThe third measure of money growth, labeled “M3 new less reference value” 
in Figure 4, shows growth rates from monthly balance-sheet data after taking out 
liabilities against non-euro area residents. This series was close to the reference 
value until the ECB’s first interest rate cut in April 1999. It accelerated faster than 
the original M3 series between April 1999 and April 2000, when it peaked at 
6.9 percent, half a percentage point above the ECB’s official money growth number,
but 1 percentage point less than the original M3 series. This indicates that deposits
held by foreigners did indeed contribute much to the growth of the original M3
series. The growth rate of the new M3 series came down faster than the previous one
during 2000, indicating that claims against euro-area financial institutions held by
non-euro area residents grew at a faster rate than those held by euro-area residents
during that period, too. It fell below the reference value in the first few months of
2001. Like the previous measure, it indicates a stronger monetary tightening during
2000 than the ECB’s official money growth rate. Starting in the spring of 2001, the
growth of the new M3 aggregate accelerated rapidly and it coincides with the growth
rate of the ECB official index since the summer of 2001. The similarity with 
the ECB index is as expected, since this is a period in which the external value of 
the euro is flat. Money growth measured in this way accelerated in October 
and November 2001, which is consistent with portfolio shifts due to the increased
political uncertainty. Overall, however, this particular factor did not contribute much
to the strong monetary expansion since May 2001. 
In Figure 4, we also plot the CPI inflation rate in the euro area. Eyeballing 
suggests a relationship between M3 growth and inflation over time. Inflation in the
euro area picked up about six months after money growth started to accelerate in late
1998. Inflation slowed six to eight months after the peak of money growth in April
2000, and decelerated after money growth had come closer to the reference value.
Note that the visual link between money growth and inflation seems considerably
weaker for the ECB’s measure of money growth than for the two alternatives based
on balance-sheet data. A renewed revival of inflation in the near future is suggested
by the renewed acceleration of money growth. A first impression, therefore, is that
there is a link between money growth and inflation in the euro area. In the next 
subsection, we pursue this issue in more detail. 
B. Money Demand in the Euro Area
Several empirical studies in the 1990s investigated the existence of a stable long-run
money demand function for broad monetary aggregates at the EMU level, e.g.,
Browne et al. (1997), Hayo (1999), Fagan and Henry (1999), Coenen and Vega
(1999), and Brand and Cassola (2000). Generally, they concluded that the stability of
money demand at the level of the monetary union was greater than the stability of
national money demand functions. Broad money demand is found to have standard
properties, i.e., long-run real income and price level elasticities of unity and a negative
and significant elasticity with respect to the yield on alternative financial assets.
We estimate a long-run money demand function for M3 based on a cointegration
framework. We use quarterly data from 1981–2001 as provided on the ECB’s 
website. Our VAR contains the growth rates of real M3 balances (M3R) and real
134 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/DECEMBER 2002GDP (Y ) and the yield on 10-year government bonds (i ) in the euro area. Real M3
is calculated using the seasonally adjusted CPI for the euro area. We also include 
a dummy variable (D90), which is zero before the third quarter of 1990 and one
thereafter and which accounts for the level effects of German unification on money
and income. The VAR system has one lag for each variable, and the error correction
term (ECT) from the cointegrating relationship. The cointegration rank test and the
maximum eigenvalue test both indicate the existence of at most one cointegrating
relationship in these data. A maximum likelihood test for the restriction implied by
using real M3 balances does not reject the hypothesis. Estimation yields the system
reported in Table 3. The ECT is estimated as
ECT = 3.9 + ln(M3R)t – lnYt + 0.037it. (3)
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Table 3  VAR Estimates
Dependent Regressor
variable ∆ M3R ∆ Y ∆ i ECT C D90 R
2
∆ M3R 0.26 0.14 –0.0001 –0.03 0.006 0.023 0.38
(0.10) (0.11) (0.002) (0.01) (0.0013) (0.005)
∆ Y 0.14 –0.14 0.004 –0.04 0.008 0.005 0.19
(0.10) (0.12) (0.002) (0.01) (0.001) (0.005)
∆ i 2.50 9.10 0.48 –1.16 –0.14 0.18 0.33
(6.48) (7.48) (0.10) (0.79) (0.08) (0.52)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
15. P* is only a proxy, since the level of output might differ in the hypothetical equilibrium.
The standard error of the coefficient on the interest rate in the regression from
which it is derived is 0.004. The hypothesis of a unit long-run income elasticity of
real money demand is not rejected. The estimated relationship can be interpreted as a
money demand function. The VAR estimates indicate that real money adjusts nega-
tively to a gap between actual and long-run equilibrium balances. This supports the
interpretation of the model as a long-run money demand function. The estimate is
practically identical with that obtained by Hayo et al. (2000), who use data covering
the period from 1981 to 1999. Our results thus confirm the impression that the
long-run money demand function of the euro area is stable. Note also that the veloc-
ity of M3 implied by our long-run money demand function exhibits no exogenous
trend, and including a trend in our model does not improve the estimate. This is in
contrast with the ECB’s claim that M3 velocity has a negative trend. That spurious
trend is most likely a result of the decline in long-run interest rates over the sample
period. Since the ECB adjusts its reference value for M3 growth for the supposed
velocity trend, the reference value is biased toward too-high money growth.
For a systematic analysis of the relationship between money and inflation, we
apply the concept of an equilibrium price level (von Hagen [1995]) or P*-model
(Hallman et al. [1991]) for the euro area. We solve the money demand function for
the equilibrium price level, pt*, that would result approximately if all prices adjusted
immediately to current output, money, and interest rates in each period.
15pt*= mt – y
r
t + 0.037it. (4)
The equilibrium price level approach holds that the actual price level adjusts 
gradually to P*over time. Specifically, the rate of inflation follows the gap between the
equilibrium price level and the actual price level with a lag. To test this hypothesis, we
estimate a model explaining the annualized quarterly change in the CPI price index by
its own lag, the change in oil prices, and the lagged gap between the equilibrium and
the actual price level.
Column (1) of Table 4 shows the estimate of this model for the period from 1981
to 1998, just before the start of EMU. The model fits the data very well. The
Durbin-Watson statistic indicates no residual autocorrelation. The estimates show
that a 1 percent increase in the gap between the equilibrium and the actual price level
results in an increase in the quarterly inflation rate of 0.11 percent in the following
period. Since the lagged inflation rate is significantly positive in this regression, the
model implies that the increase in the price gap feeds into inflation in the following
periods, too. CPI inflation also adjusts gradually to changes in oil prices. Column (2)
of Table 4 shows the estimate for the same model, but extending the sample period
to the end of 2001. The parameters are very stable, suggesting that the relationship
did not change with the beginning of EMU. Column (3) of Table 4 presents the
same estimate including the output gap as an additional regressor. It shows that the
output gap has no additional explanatory power over and above the price gap. In
sum, the estimates confirm the visual link between money growth and inflation 
suggested by Figure 4.
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Table 4  A Model for the Euro-Area Inflation Rate
(1) (2) (3)
Time period 1981/III–1998/IV 1981/III–2001/IV 1981/III–2001/IV

















2 0.850 0.810 0.820
DW 2.300 2.300 2.300
F-test (joint) 89.8000 81.2000 65.5000
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.Figure 5 shows that actual, annualized quarterly change in the CPI (“CPI 
inflation”) together with its one-step-ahead forecast (“CPI inflation forecast”) derived
from this model for 1999–2001. In addition, the figure shows the estimated price
gap. The series shown in this figure are centered three-quarter moving averages. 
The figure indicates that the price gap rose quickly from the first quarter of 1999
through the first quarter of 2000, reflecting the fact that monetary policy was overly
expansionary in the first year of EMU. This confirms our earlier discussion.
Reflecting the tightening of monetary policy, the price gap fell between mid-2000
and early 2001, and returned to a rapid increase thereafter, Actual and predicted
inflation tracks these movements with a lag and considerable smoothing. The empiri-
cal analysis thus indicates that the rising inflation in the euro area in 1999–2000 can
be attributed in part at least to the ECB’s monetary policy. The temporary increase in
actual inflation above the prediction of the model is consistent with the ECB’s view
that non-monetary factors such as the spike in food prices following the outbreak of
hoof-and-mouth disease in Europe pushed prices upward during that period. The
widening of the price gap since early 2001 signals that a further inflation potential
has been building up in the euro area.
16
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16. Our model closely resembles the price-gap model proposed by Gerlach and Svensson (2001). An important 
difference, however, is that these authors include a measure of a moving trend inflation as an explanatory variable.
This moving trend is calculated for each quarter as the slope of a Hodrick-Prescott filter for inflation. We find that,
with our data, we can reproduce the Gerlach and Svensson estimates if we replace the D90 dummy by the inflation
trend. Essentially, the moving trend reproduces the shift in the relationship after 1990. Implicitly, their model 
thus explains only the deviation of the inflation rate from trend on the basis of the equilibrium price level.
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In this section, we consider three issues. First, we review the fiscal consolidations of the
EMU member states in the 1990s. We show that the consolidation experiences vary
greatly for different member states. Second, we look at the fiscal performance since the
start of EMU. We show that the fiscal strictures did not prevent the reemergence of 
fiscal laxity. Furthermore, fiscal policy has been procyclical in the first years of EMU
and has been driven by electoral considerations after the start of EMU. Third, we show
that there are very different patterns of fiscal adjustments. Countries that successfully
reduced their debt ratios did so relying predominantly on creating sufficient growth.
The data suggest that fiscal policy contributed to that by restructuring spending away
from welfare spending and toward public investment. In contrast, countries that relied
predominantly on reducing the growth of public debt did not achieve significant
reductions in their debt burdens. 
A. Fiscal Consolidations in the 1990s 
In 1992, the EU’s average debt ratio was almost 60 percent of GDP—hence the 
60 percent limit foreseen in the Maastricht Treaty. This ratio climbed to almost 
75 percent in 1997, the year whose fiscal data were the basis for the May 1998 
decision on which countries could enter the monetary union. Since 1997, the average
debt ratio has fallen to 62.8 percent. At first glance, these data suggest that the 
political process for fiscal consolidation started with the Maastricht Treaty was rather
unsuccessful until the start of EMU. 
Several qualifications apply. First, it is important to note that the increase in the
average debt ratio was driven mainly by the large debt expansions in five states:
Germany (from 44 percent to 61 percent), France (from 40 percent to 56 percent),
Spain (from 48 percent to 70 percent), Italy (from 109 percent to 124 percent), 
and the United Kingdom (from 42 percent to 55 percent). While Belgium and
Luxembourg almost stabilized their debt ratios, the Netherlands and Ireland enjoyed
falling debt ratios during this period. The debt ratios of the other states were 
stabilized or fell after 1992.
17
An institutional arrangement relying on enforcement by an external agent such as
the European Council and the European Commission presupposes that the internal
political processes of a country respond to external pressures. A country’s size is 
probably a first indicator of the importance of an external enforcement body. Small
countries typically pay more attention to international organizations than large
countries do, and they do more so, the more they receive transfers from these
organizations. This would suggest that the EDP works more powerfully in small 
EU states than in the large states. To assess this proposition, Table 5 reports the
changes in the debt-GDP ratios for states whose GDP in 1997 was at least 7 percent
of EU GDP (large states Germany, Spain, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom),
intermediate states, whose GDP was between 2 and 7 percent (Belgium, the
Netherlands, Austria, and Sweden) and those whose GDP was less than 2 percent of
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17. Austria’s and Finland’s debt ratios increased after 1992, but these countries were not bound by the EDP at the time.EU GDP (small states Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, and
Finland). The combined GDP of the large states is 80 percent of EU GDP, that of
the intermediate states 13 percent, and the small states have a combined GDP of
7.7 percent of EU GDP. The table shows that, between 1992 and 1997, the average
debt ratio of the small states increased by just 3.3 percent, much less than that of 
the large states, which rose by almost 19 percent. Between 1997 and 2001, the small
states achieved a reduction in their debt ratios of almost 20 percent, much more than
the 5.3 percent of the large states. Intermediate states behaved much like small states 
during this period. 
This evidence suggests that the fiscal framework of EMU is more effective in the
small than in the large states. But this means that the framework is most effective
where it matters the least. After all, a fiscal crisis in a small EMU member state would
hardly pose a serious threat to the stability of the common currency. A fiscal crisis in
a large state might do that, and the data suggest that the fiscal rules are much less
effective in those member states. Recent anecdotal evidence confirms this impression.
When the German government came under pressure in early 2002, an election year
in Germany, for not complying with its fiscal targets, the German finance minister
promised to balance the budget by 2004. This is widely regarded as a commitment
that Germany cannot achieve given economic and public revenue projections. Thus,
the incident suggests that Germany expects to get away with making promises that
will not be fulfilled. Shortly afterward, the newly appointed French government
announced that France plans to postpone balancing its budget until 2007, three years
later than its commitments from the last two years had foreseen, and the Italian 
government stated a similar intention. 
The second qualification is that the observation of fiscal consolidations in some EU
states during the 1990s does not mean that these can be attributed to the institutional
provisions of the European Treaty. In fact, since most European countries experienced
sizeable fiscal expansions during the 1970s and 1980s, a period of consolidation could
be expected in the 1990s in any case. In a study of European fiscal policy in the 1990s,
Hughes Hallett et al. (2001) consider this argument in more detail. They estimate
empirical models explaining the likelihood and duration of fiscal consolidations for all
EU countries using data from the 1970s and 1980s. They then use the parameters 
estimated in this exercise to calculate the probability and the expected duration of 
fiscal consolidations using 1990s data. The results show that the empirical models 
predict almost all of the observed consolidations correctly. In other words, given the
high debt ratios and the economic environment of the 1990s, the observed consolida-
tions could be expected just by extrapolating the patterns of fiscal performance of EU
states in the 1970s and 1980s. This lends little force to the claim that the Maastricht
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Table 5  Country Size and Government Debt in the 1990s
Change in debt ratio All EU countries Large states Intermediate  Small states (percent) states 
1992–97 15.8 18.8 4.1 3.3
1997–2001 –12.0 –5.3 –18.2 –19.8
Source: European Commission, Statistical Appendix of European Economy (Spring 2002). process was important in making the EU countries embark on a process of fiscal 
consolidation.
18 Hughes Hallett et al. (2001) find some weak evidence of a “Maastricht
effect” increasing the likelihood of fiscal consolidations in the years between 1992 
and 1995. However, this effect only increased the likelihood of revenue-based con-
solidations, which are less likely to last than expenditure-based consolidations. Thus, 
if the creation of the fiscal framework of the Maastricht Treaty had any positive effect
on the governments’ willingness to undertake fiscal adjustments, the effect vanished
early and its consequences were only short lived.
B. Fiscal Performance since the Start of EMU
After 1997, the EU countries enjoyed a decline in their debt ratios. With the 
exception of 2001, the same years, however, were also a period of relatively strong
growth in Europe. Since the fiscal performance is measured in terms of debt and 
surplus ratios relative to GDP, it is not clear to what extent the observed reductions
in government debt and deficit ratios can be attributed to government policy as
opposed to windfall gains from strong economic growth. In this subsection, we assess
the recent performance, trying to separate policy from the effects of growth. 
Separating the two requires making some assumptions about the contribution of
growth to the deficit ratio. To do this, we use a simple method of growth accounting.
For each year, we estimate the change in the government surplus ratio due to 
economic growth and a “neutral” policy. Subtracting the two from the observed
change in the surplus ratio gives us an estimate of the active policy stance.
19 Let the
primary surplus ratio, st, be
Rt –Gt st = ——— = (rt – gt), (5)
Yt
where R denotes government revenues, G non-interest government spending, and Y
GDP. The change in this ratio over time then is 
∆ Rt – ∆ Gt ∆ Yt ∆ st = ———— – — —(rt – gt), (6)
Yt–1 Yt–1
where r =R/Y, and g = G/Y. We define a “neutral” fiscal policy as one that keeps the
average tax rate, r, and the ratio of government spending to trend GDP constant.
With this definition, the contribution of the neutral policy to the change in the 
surplus ratio is 
∆ Yt ∆ Y
trend
∆ st
N = —–rt–1 – (— —) gt–t. (7)
Yt–1 Y
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18. An intriguing interpretation is that the governments wrote fiscal goals into the European Treaty that they were
willing to try to achieve anyway. 
19. Alternatively, one might use the OECD’s cyclically adjusted budget balance and the OECD’s estimates of changes
in structural balances. These estimates, however, are based on elasticities derived from past data and policies. If the
1990s indeed brought a change in the fiscal policy regime in Europe, they could be quite misleading.The contribution of the business cycle to the change in the surplus ratio is defined as
∆ Yt ∆ Y
trend
∆ st
G = gt [—– – (—–) ].   (8)
Yt–1 Y
This is the change that would occur in addition to the neutral change, if the 
government simply allowed economic growth above or below trend to change the
expenditure ratio. We estimate the trend growth rate as the average real growth rate
during the 1990s. We obtain the policy-induced change in the surplus ratio as
∆ st
P = ∆ st – ∆ st
N – ∆ st
G. (9)
This is our indicator of fiscal policy stance, since it measures the contribution of
any discretionary policy actions to observed changes in the surplus ratio. Table 6
has our calculations for the years from 1998 to 2001. Columns labeled “observed”
give the raw changes in surplus ratios, while columns labeled “policy” give the 
estimated policy stance from equation (9). Since the decision on EMU membership
was taken in 1998 on the basis of fiscal data for 1997, 1998 was the first year after
1992 in which the governments of the EMU member states were no longer under 
the risk of not making it into the monetary union due to excessively lax fiscal 
policies. In the table, a negative number indicates a fiscal expansion, a positive 
number a fiscal contraction.
20
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20. See Hughes Hallett et al. (2001) and Hallerberg et al. (2001) for similar calculations and results.
Table 6  Fiscal Policy Stance, 1998–2001
Country
1998 99 2000 01
Observed Policy Observed Policy Observed Policy Observed Policy
Belgium 0.7 0.5 –0.3 –1.3 0.4 –1.5 –0.1 0.8
Germany 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.0 –1.1 –1.5 –0.4
Greece 1.1 0.2 0.9 –0.2 0.6 –1.1 0.1 –1.6
Spain 0.1 –1.2 0.8 –0.4 0.4 –0.9 0.2 0.0
France 0.2 –1.4 0.8 –0.3 0.2 –1.2 –0.1 –0.3
Ireland 0.4 –1.0 –1.0 –3.8 1.9 –1.4 –3.4 –3.5
Italy –1.5 –1.8 –0.2 –0.3 –0.3 –1.5 0.2 0.0
Luxembourg 0.3 –0.5 0.6 –0.4 1.9 –0.4 –0.7 –1.0
Netherlands 0.0 –1.4 0.8 0.0 0.5 –0.2 –1.8 –0.4
Austria –0.6 –1.9 –0.1 –0.6 0.7 –0.0 1.4 2.6
Portugal –0.5 –1.9 –0.2 –0.7 0.4 –0.1 –1.0 –0.2
Finland 2.2 –1.3 0.1 –2.1 4.8 1.1 –2.2 –1.0
Denmark 0.4 0.0 1.3 1.2 –1.1 –2.0 0.4 1.7
Sweden 2.8 0.6 –1.4 –4.7 1.6 –0.6 0.3 0.8
United Kingdom 2.5 1.9 0.1 0.2 0.3 –0.3 –1.0 –1.0
EMU 0.0 –0.9 0.5 –0.1 0.0 –1.4 –0.4 –0.1
Source: European Commission, Statistical Appendix of European Economy (Spring 2002).The table bears a number of interesting observations. The first is that the con-
tribution of economic growth to the surplus ratios is large enough to hide the true
policy stance in many cases. For example, France and Spain experienced rising
observed surplus ratios in 1998, while their policy stance was actually expansionary.
On average, the EMU surplus ratio remained unchanged in 1998 and 2000, while
the weighted average policy stance was negative. In 2001, the observed change in the
surplus ratio was negative in most countries and on average in the EMU, reflecting
the weak economic growth in that year.
The second, interesting observation is that “consolidation fatigue”—the loss of
political interest in pursuing further consolidations—emerged in many countries in
the first year after the threat of not making it to EMU membership had disappeared.
The (non-weighted) average fiscal impulse among the EMU member countries in
1998 was –1.0 percent of GDP, with a standard deviation of the mean of 0.25. 
This compares to an average fiscal impulse in all other country-years of –0.5 percent
of GDP with a standard deviation of 0.19. The t-test rejects the null hypothesis 
of equal means, which indicates that the 1998 fiscal impulses were significantly 
more expansionary among the EMU member states. Thus, these countries used the
first opportunity to relax fiscal policies, even though 1998 was a year of relatively
strong economic growth. Interestingly, the countries that did not join EMU in 
1999, Denmark, Greece, Sweden, and the United Kingdom all maintained tight or
contractionary fiscal policies in 1998.
The third observation from this table is a tendency for fiscal policy to be 
procyclical in the EMU.
21 While the trend growth rate over the 1990s was 2 percent 
for the EMU, the actual growth rates were 2.9 percent, 2.6 percent, 3.4 percent, and 
1.6 percent during 1998–2001. Thus, the two years with the strongest economic
expansions also saw the largest fiscal expansions, while the two years with less growth
saw a more or less neutral policy. Furthermore, Belgium, Austria, Denmark, and
Sweden all switched from a fiscal expansion in 2000 to a fiscal contraction in 2001,
while Germany, Spain, France, Italy, and Portugal went from a fiscal expansion in
2000 to a more or less neutral policy in 2001. Only Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, and Finland managed to achieve a countercyclical fiscal impulse in
the face of the incipient recession. The tendency to behave in a procyclical way may
indeed be a result of a fiscal policy that relaxes in times of strong economic growth
and tightens in times of recession for fear of hitting the limits set by the EDP and the
SGP. This tendency could be caused by the fact that the fiscal criteria of the EDP and
the SGP are related to raw surplus ratios unadjusted for cyclical effects.
A fourth observation emerges from considering the election dates in European
countries in recent years. If governments use fiscal policies to improve their chances
for reelection, one should expect fiscal expansions in the year preceding the election.
Table 7 indicates which years were pre-election years in which EU country. Here we
count both parliamentary and presidential elections where applicable.
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21. Such a tendency was also noted by the European Commission (2000). Buti et al. (1998) show that procyclicality
was already a property of EU fiscal policies in the 1980s.Collecting the data from these country-cases, we find that the (unweighted) 
average fiscal impulse in pre-election years is –0.88 percent of GDP, with a standard
deviation of the mean of 0.25. The average fiscal impulse in all other country-year
cases is –0.49 percent of GDP with a standard deviation of the mean of 0.2. The 
t-test for the difference between the two averages is t = –2.5, which is significant at
conventional levels. Thus, the data indicate that the fiscal strictures of the EDP and
the SGP do not prevent governments from using fiscal policies to pursue electoral
interests. Our estimates confirm similar results in Hallerberg et al. (2001), who use a
somewhat different methodology.
C. Patterns of Fiscal Adjustment in EMU
A rapidly growing literature has recently shown that the success of fiscal consoli-
dations depends critically on the form of the budgetary adjustments undertaken. 
In this literature, success typically refers to the longevity of the fiscal consolidation:
consolidations are deemed successful if the reduction in the public-sector deficit ratio
does not vanish soon.
22 A key finding of this line of research is that consolidations 
are more likely to succeed if they rely primarily on spending cuts rather than 
raising additional revenues. Within the broad category of spending, cuts in transfers
and public-sector wages make consolidations more likely to succeed, while cuts in
investment spending reduce the likelihood of success. Such results, which have been
confirmed for very different time periods and groups of countries, can be interpreted
as saying that consolidations are more likely to succeed if the governments are willing
to address sensitive political issues and choices. 
A related issue on the European agenda is the call for an improvement of the
“quality” of public finances first formulated by the European Council of Lisbon in
2000. Without defining precisely what the “quality” of public finances means, the
council recognized that the structure of public spending and taxation has important
consequences for economic growth and called upon the EU member states to aim at
a more growth-friendly structure of public finances. Endogenous growth theory
broadly suggests that a shift from taxing factor incomes to taxing consumption and 
a shift from public consumption and transfer spending to public investment has 
positive growth effects (Aghion and Howitt [1998]). Empirical results in this area 
are mixed, but they suggest that fiscal policies do affect growth.
23
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22. E.g., Perotti et al. (1998), Strauch and von Hagen (2001), and von Hagen, Hughes Hallett, and Strauch (2002).
23. See Cashin (1995), Tanzi and Zee (1997), Fölster and Henrekson (1999), Kneller et al. (1999), Kneller (2000),
and Gemmell and Kneller (2002).
Table 7  Pre-Election Years in EMU
Pre-election year 1998 99 2000 01
Austria, Belgium, Spain, Finland, Denmark, Italy, Germany, France,
Country Finland, Portugal, Greece Portugal, Portugal,  Sweden,
Luxembourg United Kingdom Netherlands, Ireland
Source: www.electionworld.org.   Thus, the pattern of fiscal adjustment matters from a macroeconomic perspective.
Subsequently, we characterize the fiscal policies of EMU member states to assess the
strength of this conjecture. We do this with a series of cross-section regressions focus-
ing on the period since 1997. All data are taken from the Statistical Appendix of
European Economy (Spring 2002), published by the European Commission. While
the cross-sections have obvious data limitations, the following bits of evidence add up
to a picture that underscores the importance of the structure of fiscal adjustments
more generally.
24
We start by noting that the fiscal rules of the EDP and SGP focus on a reference
value for public debt relative to GDP. For countries with ratios exceeding the critical
limit, there are two ways to reduce it, by slowing the growth of nominal debt or by
speeding up the growth of GDP. Since inflation is no longer under the control of
domestic monetary policy, the latter is equivalent to speeding up real GDP growth. A
first question we look at considers the choice of the EMU governments between
these two options.
Let d = B/Y be the ratio of public debt, B, to GDP, Y. The relative contribution 
of growth in public debt and growth in real GDP to the change in this ratio in 
country i can be written as
1 + bi Ci = 100 (——– – 1), (10)
1 + gi
where b is the growth rate of nominal debt and g is the growth rate of real GDP. 
If Ci > 0, the growth of public debt contributed more to the change in the debt ratio
than the growth of real GDP; otherwise, real GDP growth dominated. 
Figure 6 plots Ci against the real growth rates of the EU countries for two time
periods, 1992–97 and 1997–2001. Positive values on the x-axis indicate that the
change in the debt ratio during the period considered was due to growth rates of
public debt in excess of the growth rate of real GDP. This was true in almost all EU
countries in the first period. In contrast, public debt grew less than real GDP in all
countries since 1997. Significantly, the figure also shows a strong correlation between
the average real GDP growth rate over the post-1997 period and the relative contri-
bution of GDP growth to the change in the debt ratio. Such a relationship did not
exist in the first half of the 1990s.
Figure 7 plots the relative contributions of debt and real GDP growth against the
change in the debt ratio during the period under consideration. In the earlier period,
when debt ratios increased, this was due to debt growing much faster than real GDP.
In the later years, however, the pattern is reversed. Countries that achieved a large
decline in the debt ratio were countries that achieved high real GDP growth rates 
relative to the growth rate of debt over this period. Countries that achieved little 
real growth relative to debt growth also did not manage to reduce their debt ratios
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24. To facilitate reading the following figures, note that an R-square of 0.20 in the following regressions corresponds
to the 10 percent critical value, and an R-square of 0.26 to the 5 percent critical value of the F-distribution of a
test for statistical significance.significantly. The figure thus suggests that a successful strategy to reduce the debt
ratio is one that focuses on growing out of the debt burden rather than one that
focuses on slowing the growth rate of debt while neglecting economic growth. Taking
Figures 6 and 7 together, a clear message emerges. Without reviving economic
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2 = 0.7042growth, a significant reduction in the debt burden is unlikely. Taking the two periods
together, another message is that rising debt burdens come from a lack of control
over public-sector debt. But to reduce an excessive debt burden, controlling debt is
only a necessary condition. Without reviving economic growth, a significant decline
in the debt burden seems unlikely. This suggests that the fiscal framework of EMU is
ill conceived. The focus on deficits and debt growth alone would be justified if EMU
had started in a period in which public debt burdens could be regarded as compatible
with long-run equilibrium. Given that a reduction in the debt burden is necessary
particularly in the large countries, the policy framework pays too little attention to
the role of economic growth in achieving sustainable public finances. 
Next, we turn to public-sector revenues and spending. In Figure 8, we look at the
relative contributions of debt and real GDP growth to changes in the debt ratio
together with the changes in a number of fiscal indicators. In this figure, “revenue”
and “total spending” refer to the ratios of public-sector revenues and expenditures to
GDP; “social transfers” and “investment” relate to the shares of transfers to house-
holds and total capital expenditures in total spending. The figure plots the changes in
these indicators over the 1997–2001 period for the EU countries. The figure shows,
first, that countries where expenditure and revenue ratios fell during this period were
countries that achieved a larger contribution of economic growth to the change in
the debt ratio, hence a larger reduction in the debt ratio. The R-squares indicate that
these relations are statistically significant. Importantly, this suggests that a strategy of
raising tax rates to increase revenues is unlikely to succeed in reducing an excessive
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2 = 0.0939debt burden, because it slows economic growth. This is the German predicament of
fiscal policy after 1994. Repeated increases in tax rates only resulted in ever smaller
growth, with the result that Germany did not manage to approach budget balance
nor reduce its debt burden sufficiently.
25
The same figure also points to a critical role of investment spending and spending
on social transfers. Countries that increased the share of investment spending tended
to achieve a stronger contribution of GDP growth to the reduction in the debt 
burden, while the opposite is true for countries that increased the share of social
transfers in total spending. We look at this issue in more detail below.
In Figure 9, we look at the tax burden and the composition of revenues. The 
figure plots the change in the tax burden and the change in the share of direct taxes
in total revenues against the growth rate of real GDP. Direct taxes include social 
security charges on labor. We take direct taxes as rough proxies for the average tax
rate on factor incomes. The figure shows that an increasing share of taxes on factor
incomes coincides with a falling growth rate in this sample. Furthermore, a higher
total tax burden in the economy coincides with a lower growth rate. Figure 10
supports this impression by plotting the change in the tax burden and the change 
in the share of direct taxes in total revenues against growth rate of real GDP over 
the 1997–2001 period. The statistical relation is weaker, but this may be due to a
nonlinearity that is still compatible with a negative relationship between these two
variables and economic growth. In sum, the evidence suggests that reducing tax 
burdens and shifting revenues from taxes on factor incomes to, say, consumption,
147
Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the European Monetary Union
25. For a detailed account of German fiscal policy in the 1990s, see Strauch and von Hagen (1999).
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Share of direct taxes in total revenueshelps to achieve higher growth rates. While this is admittedly painted with a broad
brush, it is also consistent with growth theory and the evidence from larger studies of
tax policy and growth. 
In Figure 11, we look at the composition of total government spending in con-
nection with the average real GDP growth rate of the EU countries in 1997–2001.
The figure shows a strong association of higher shares of public investment and real
GDP growth. Clearly, this correlation must be regarded with some caution, as public
investment is a notoriously vague concept in practice. Furthermore, the direction of
causality might be that countries having exogenously low growth rates cut public
investment first, as political opposition against cutting transfer spending is more
powerful than political opposition against cutting spending on public infrastructure,
etc. In fact, such political economy effects may be particularly large under the condi-
tions of the EDP and the SGP, when governments are forced to cut public spending
quickly to avoid violating the numerical constraints. Still, one would have to assume
that public investment has no positive effect on growth at all to argue that this would
not eventually lead to lower growth rates. The same figure also suggests that higher
shares of transfer spending in total spending go together with lower rates of growth,
although this relation is only marginally statistically significant.
Figure 12 supports the impression from the previous figure by showing the change
in the shares of these two categories in total spending during the 1997–2001 period
and the growth rate of real GDP. Here, we see that countries increasing the share 
of public investment enjoyed higher growth rates, while countries increasing the 
share of welfare spending realized weaker growth. Both relations are only marginally
significant, however. 
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Change in share of total spendingFinally, in Figure 13 we look at the correlation between fiscal consolidation and
real GDP growth. We do this by plotting the growth rate of public debt together
with the growth rate of real GDP for the two time periods, 1992–97 and
1997–2001. The figure and the two regressions indicate that there is no significant
correlation between these two. High growth rates of public debt in the early period
apparently did nothing to stimulate economic growth, and lower growth rates in the
latter period did not reduce growth. Nor does the figure give much credence to the
concept of “non-Keynesian” effects of fiscal consolidations, i.e., the notion that a
reduction in public debt would have positive growth effects by stimulating private
investment and consumption (Giavazzi and Pagano [1990]). Such effects would lead
us to expect higher growth rates for those countries where public debt actually shrank
in the period under consideration. Obviously, the present bivariate framework is not
sufficient to achieve a strong conclusion on this matter. Nevertheless, it is in line with
the results from a larger econometric model presented in Hughes Hallett et al.
(2001), which do not indicate “non-Keynesian” effects of the fiscal consolidations in
Europe in the past decade. In passing, we note that our evidence here points to a
methodological problem of earlier studies of such effects. Specifically, most studies
identify fiscal consolidations as periods of significant reductions in public debt or
deficit ratios, and “non-Keynesian” effects as episodes where consolidations go along
with vigorous economic growth. The European experience suggests that such
episodes may have more to do with policies that succeeded in stimulating growth by
restructuring public spending and taxation and reducing tax burdens than with a
reduction in public debt or deficits.
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2 = 0.0847We can summarize the evidence from this section by pointing out the emergence of
two alternative strategies of fiscal adjustment in EMU, represented most clearly by 
two groups of countries (Table 8). On the one hand, there is a low-growth group of
countries consisting of Germany, France, Italy, and Austria. On the other hand, there
is a high-growth group consisting of Ireland, Finland, Greece, and Spain. Low-growth
countries have relied relatively largely on stabilizing the growth of public-sector debt to
achieve the targets under the SGP, while high-growth countries have relied mainly on
achieving strong economic growth. Clearly, the second group has been much more
successful in moving toward sustainable public finances than the first group. The first
group is also characterized by relatively small achievements in reducing tax burdens
and by low and stable ratios of public investment. In contrast, the high-growth 
countries, with the exception of Greece, have reduced their tax burdens and shifted
government spending from welfare to public investment. Among the remaining 
countries, the Netherlands achieved an average growth rate of 5.3 percent and reduced
its debt burden by almost 21 percent, relying much more strongly on growth than the
low-growth group. Belgium, with a real growth rate of 3.9 percent and a reduction in
the debt ratio of 23.4 percent, follows a similar pattern. Portugal is more exceptional,
as it achieved a relatively high growth rate of 5.3 percent, but reduced its debt ratio by
no more than 8 percent. 
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Table 8  Patterns of Fiscal Adjustment, 1997–2001
Average
Relative contribution 
Change in share Change in share
real growth
Change in B/Y of debt and 
of transfers of investment GDP growth
Low growth 2.8 –6.8 –7.6 0.6 0.8
Germany 2.3 –2.5 –4.0 0.0 0.7
France 2.3 –3.9 –6.4 0.2 0.5
Italy 3.1 –16.2 –12.9 1.0 0.4
Austria 3.3 –4.7 –7.0 0.6 1.4
High growth 7.8 21.8 28.2 –1.5 4.0
Ireland 12.6 –38.5 –51.3 –2.8 6.0
Finland 6.2 –15.2 –25.5 –1.4 0.4
Greece 6.7 –20.0 –16.7 –1.1 8.4
Spain 5.6 –13.6 –19.3 –0.7 1.2
Non-EMU 4.0 –18.3 28.3 –0.3 –0.3
Denmark 3.4 –19.9 –30.3 –0.9 –0.5
Sweden 4.3 –19.9 –26.3 0.6 –0.6
United Kingdom 4.4 –15.1 –27.8 –0.6 0.8
Source: European Commission, Statistical Appendix of European Economy (Spring 2002).
Finally, it is interesting to observe that the non-EMU countries, Denmark,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom, look much more like the high-growth group in
EMU during this period of time. The two Scandinavian countries in this group,
however, reduced the share of public investment in total spending. 
Do these results matter for EMU? After all, one might argue that the stability of
the common currency depends only on the stability of public-sector debt ratios. How
this stability is achieved might be left to the choice of the individual member states.The subsidiarity principle of the Treaty on European Union would then suggest that
the EU should not interfere with these choices.
There are, however, at least two counterarguments to this. The first is that, if
Europeans truly believe that public debt ratios must be low and sustainable, success
in achieving this matters and is a valid concern for the EU. From this perspective, the
current fiscal framework is incomplete, because it does not give EMU member states
enough guidance for the choice of a successful fiscal strategy. Countries should be
encouraged to adopt more growth-friendly policies by restructuring their tax and
expenditure systems.
Second, it is necessary to recognize that EMU did not start under conditions of a
long-run equilibrium as far as public finances are concerned. The low growth rates in
Germany, France, and Italy in particular are the result of overregulated economies
plagued by high tax burdens and welfare systems that discourage employment. The
narrow focus of the EDP and the SGP on annual deficits, however, may keep govern-
ments from adopting reform policies that might result in larger deficits initially
before the desired growth and employment effects kick in. If so, the current design 
of the fiscal strictures risks keeping these countries in a state of low growth with
insufficient progress also as regards the reduction of debts and deficits. One may 
reasonably doubt that these large EMU states will continue to tolerate such a 
scenario, which is perceived as keeping them from adopting better economic policies
for the sake of some fiscal targets imposed by the EU. The recent episodes involving
France and Germany clearly indicate that they will not. But if the outcome were that
these countries simply began to ignore the goals of the EDP and the SGP, other states
would follow and the fiscal framework of EMU would fall apart. A redesign of this
framework to account for the circumstances of the large states seems necessary to
avoid such a development. 
VI. Conclusions
In this paper, we have reviewed the monetary and fiscal policy experiences of the new
monetary union in Europe in its first few years. On the monetary side, the experience
is encouraging so far. Long-run monetary relations continue to be stable, and a focus
of monetary policy on monetary developments is justified from the data. Still, 2002
will be the third year in which inflation in the euro area is above the ECB’s 2 percent
threshold above which price stability does not prevail. This suggests that the ECB’s
policy was not sufficiently tight particularly in its first year, and that it should pay
more attention to the developments under the “first pillar” of its strategy. In line 
with the ECB’s (and our) interpretation of its strategy, what we mean by this is not
that the ECB should blindly pursue a numerical target for M3 growth. It should,
however, increase the weight of the implications for future inflation in its current
decisions and reduce the weight given to the short-run considerations arising from
the “second pillar.”
On the fiscal side, the picture is more mixed. The fiscal rules created by the EMU
seem to be more effective where they matter less, namely in the small states. They did
152 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/DECEMBER 2002not keep EMU states from relaxing fiscal discipline after the critical decision on
EMU membership had been made, nor from using fiscal policies for electoral 
purposes. There is also a tendency for fiscal policy to be procyclical. Patterns of 
fiscal adjustment in recent years show that sustainable public finances need fiscal
policies that stimulate and maintain sufficiently high long-run growth rates. The 
fiscal framework needs further improvements, taking this insight into account. 
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NIGEL H. JENKINSON
Bank of England
Jürgen von Hagen and Matthias Brückner have produced a very interesting and 
comprehensive paper that surveys the experience of the European Monetary Union
(EMU) in the first three and a half years of operation. The paper addresses well the
key monetary and fiscal policy issues over this period.
26 Despite the limited data span,
which inevitably affects all empirical analysis of EMU, the authors undertake a wide
range of econometric testing to support their theories. As the authors acknowledge,
some of the statistical analysis must inevitably be considered rather illustrative and
tentative. Given that, there are risks that some of the results are not fully robust, 
particularly as analysis by other “EMU watchers,” such as the Centre for Economic
Policy Research (CEPR) (Alesina et al. [2001] and Begg et al. [2002]) and the Centre
for European Policy Studies (CEPS) (Gros et al. [2002]) is sometimes at odds 
with the authors’ findings. Nonetheless, the empirical analysis is very welcome, as it
provides substance to the paper. It also challenges readers who may not necessarily
share the authors’ views to come up with alternative explanations.
My comments will focus on four conclusions in the paper:
• European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy was consistently less tight than
Bundesbank policy would have been.
• Germany and France carry a disproportionate weight in ECB decisions.
• The ECB would do well to pay more attention to the first pillar of its monetary
policy strategy.
• Sustainable public finances require fiscal policies that stimulate and maintain
sufficiently high long-run growth rates. The fiscal framework needs further
improvements.
I. The Tightness of Monetary Policy and the Weight of 
Germany and France
Based on a Taylor rule, which draws on estimates of a pre-EMU Bundesbank policy
reaction function, von Hagen and Brückner argue that ECB policy was loose relative
to Bundesbank experience, particularly in the early stages of the Monetary Union 
in 1999. While some other authors share this view on monetary policy in the 
period immediately following the launch of the single currency (e.g., Faust et al.
[2001] and  Alesina et al. [2001]), there is little agreement on the analytical reasons.
For example, Faust et al. (2001) and Peersman and Smets (1999) suggest that the
implicit weight on the output gap may be higher for the ECB than for the
Bundesbank. Alternatively, Alesina et al. (2001) suggest that the ECB was focusing
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26. I am very grateful for discussions with colleagues at the Bank of England on this paper, particularly Andrew
Bailey, Gert Peersman, Vincent Labhard, Gabriel Sterne, Georgios Chortareas, and Karen Dury.instead on core inflation and a measure of forecast inflation, while Begg et al. (2002)
argue that monetary policy was set broadly in line with a “rule” which weights core
inflation and actual GDP growth. Von Hagen and Brückner test a number of these
alternative hypotheses and reject them in favor of the view that the ECB places 
disproportionate weight on developments in Germany and France, a suggestion 
considered and rejected by others (Alesina et al. [2001]).
To my mind, the various studies and their conflicting results are a salutary
reminder of the limitations of Taylor rule analysis: such analysis provides a useful
benchmark for assessing policy, but it is no more than a benchmark. There are many
uncertain elements:
•  the measurement of the output gap, where different authors adopt different
techniques;
•  the estimates of the response coefficients on the deviation of inflation from 
target and the output gap;
• the estimate of the equilibrium interest rate;
• whether central banks focus on core rather than actual inflation;
• whether the Taylor rule should be explicitly forward looking or not; and
• the paucity and shortcomings of the data.
And of course, no central bank admits to using a Taylor rule as a firm guide for
setting policy. Given these limitations, which are recognized by the authors, the
robustness testing in the paper is very welcome. But there is scope for rather more of
it (e.g., the analysis of forward-looking behavior is applied only in the context of 
the estimated German/French rule, and a higher weight on the output gap is only
considered in the context of core inflation).
The authors suggest that the predominant influence of the economic situation in
Germany and France on the ECB’s policy is a relatively robust finding, and also note
that the rules for Germany and France together provide similar “recommendations”
on interest rates to those that would have applied if the ECB had focused on national
developments in either country individually (given that Germany experienced lower
inflation rates but also a lower output gap than in France). At the same time, 
they suggest that the Bundesbank would have set higher interest rates for the euro
area than for Germany. So, relative to a position pre-EMU, when other countries
closely followed the Bundesbank’s interest rate lead and the Bundesbank set rates to
maintain domestic price stability, a corollary of the authors’ results is that Monetary
Union may have led to little difference in area-wide monetary policy when perhaps it
should have, given the shift in focus to the euro area.
27
As noted above, different authors have put forward alternative interpretations
based on variants of the Taylor rule analysis. Given the uncertainties of the estimates,
the limitations of the data, and that estimated rules should be viewed only as a
benchmark, my view is that it is premature to draw strong conclusions.
Although I do not judge that the hypothesis that Germany and France have
undue weight in ECB decisions is proven, one additional argument that might be
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27. In practice, this suggestion should be qualified to the extent that there was not full interest rate convergence in
the run-up to EMU.considered further by the authors is that the data for Germany and France are among
the most timely in the euro area. It is possible that given their importance and overall
weight, these data might be viewed as an early proxy for the euro area as a whole. The
implicit result in the paper is, however, that they have not been a particularly good
proxy ex post over the past three years. 
II. Weight on the Monetary Pillar
The authors also conclude that the weight on the ECB’s first pillar (a detailed analysis
of monetary developments) should be increased—a recommendation diametrically
opposed to the recent publications by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (Begg
et al. [2002]) and the Centre for European Policy Studies (Gros et al. [2002]), which
suggest the pillar should be abandoned. Why is this, and is there any common ground?
All central bankers recognize that monetary developments matter for the inflation
process and that the signals and information content of monetary and credit aggregates
are important. There is a well-documented, strong empirical link between money and
inflation in the medium and long term—for example, a recent study at the Bank of
England (King [2002]) reported that the correlation coefficient between broad 
money growth and inflation over the past 30 years (1968–98) for 116 countries was
0.99, while that between broad money growth and output growth was –0.08. But 
correlation is not the same as causation, and stable structural relationships between
money growth, demand, output, and price movements can give rise to unstable short-
run correlations between them. In practice, the relationship is highly complex. As the
ECB’s chief economist, Otmar Issing, notes:
Econometric evidence suggests that euro area M3 both has a stable relationship
with the price level in the long run and possesses leading indicator properties for
inflation over the medium term.
But
Monetary developments may be subject to a host of special influences and 
distortions which render the relationship between money and prices complex in
the short run.
28
Because of this, M3 growth is viewed by the ECB as an important indicator of the
possible trend of future medium-term inflation, but is not regarded as an invariable
short-term guide to policy decisions (Issing [2001]). One challenge for the ECB is in
communicating how this medium-term orientation feeds into the monthly policy




28. See Issing (2001).The approach taken in the paper of estimating a P* or “money/price gap” model
appears to conform to the ECB’s broad framework quite well—a medium- or long-
run divergence between the price level and its estimated (monetary) equilibrium 
provides explanatory power in an inflation equation. Again, though, there are data
and econometric challenges—the authors take issue with ECB on the measurement
of money (in particular on the treatment of nonresident deposits) and also note that
while the euro-area money demand function appears relatively stable to date they 
do not identify a trend in velocity (in contrast to the ECB’s assessment). They also
estimate a P* model without the long-run trend adopted by previous authors such as
Gerlach and Svensson (2001), on the reasonable premise that they wish to explain
trend inflation. But this approach may give rise to an econometric problem if there is
an omitted trend that should be present in the equation, as the omission will affect
the estimated coefficients on the other variables. 
The authors put forward two conclusions based on the P*analysis:
• Excess money growth in 1999 contributed to higher inflation.
• The inflationary spike of early 2001 was due to special factors.
It would be helpful to provide additional information on the robustness of these
conclusions. Given the form of the preferred equation, it appears, by eye at least, from
Figure 5 (p. 137) that the lagged impact of the pickup in actual inflation during 1999
and early 2000 might account for a considerable proportion of the rise in the consumer
price index (CPI) inflation forecast, with the price gap term making a relatively small 
contribution.  To allay this concern, some statistics on the contributions of the price
gap term and the other terms to the within-sample fit over the past three years would
be useful. Is the price gap term providing much of the explanatory power in practice
over this period?
A major practical challenge with the authors’ recommendation is that it demands
a lot of the ECB in terms of being able to identify and interpret shocks in real time.
At the start of Monetary Union in 1999, how easy was it to separate a genuine 
monetary shock from the possibility of a shock from the change in policy regime?
And how easy was it to quantify the importance of special factors affecting inflation
in 2001? The authors are attaching high weight to relatively simple money demand
models. There are risks of over-reliance on such an approach, which may help to
explain the puzzle of why the study of the information content of money has fared
relatively poorly against a backdrop of a strong consensus that inflation is a monetary
phenomenon. More broadly, there are risks of asking too much of money demand
models and condemning them when they fail to deliver, or—as in the current
paper—having them deliver, but not in a fully convincing way.
I would be cautious in concluding from the evidence presented that more weight
should be added to the monetary pillar. I would nonetheless share much common
ground with the authors. A broad conclusion among most central bankers is that 
estimates of long-run money demand and corresponding estimates of the excess stock
of money are useful information variables. In turn, they pose important questions
and challenges on the sources of economic and financial shocks, which may provide
valuable input to policy. But rarely can they act as a simple guide. I prefer to interpret
the authors’ results in that spirit.
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The authors undertake a range of cross-section regressions pre- and post-EMU, 
drawing the following conclusions on the fiscal framework:
• EMU fiscal rules exert more discipline on small than on large countries.
• The euro-area fiscal stance has been procyclical.
• It is easier to reduce debt levels when growth is strong.
• Fiscal consolidation is more likely to succeed based on spending cuts rather than
revenue increases.
These conclusions are broadly in line with the findings of other researchers. It is 
nevertheless the case that the conclusions must inevitably be regarded as rather broad
brush, given the very small sample size for some of the regressions, as the authors 
recognize. One qualification to the conclusions is that the potential importance of
the initial value of debt and the perceptions of fiscal sustainability may be exerting 
a substantial influence on the results in recent years as well as in the run-up to the
start of EMU. It would be useful to extend the analysis in the paper which suggests
that the observed fiscal consolidations in the 1990s could be expected just by 
extrapolating the experience of the 1970s and 1980s. Is that still true over the past
three years? A further qualification is that some small countries (such as Ireland and
Greece) have been growing very fast, reflecting a “catch-up” in living standards. And
a final qualification is that there is no commonly agreed and reconciled method of
undertaking cyclical adjustment to separate discretionary policy from the impact of
the automatic stabilizers. All require some estimate of trend growth. In that vein, 
the authors suggest that the 1990s average of actual growth rates is preferable to 
alternative estimates produced, among others, by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
To assess the importance of the cyclical adjustment method, the table below 
compares the authors’ estimate of the change in the euro-area structural primary 
balance with that published very recently by the OECD (2002).
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Table  Change in Structural Primary Balance/GDP Ratio in the Euro Area
Percentage points
1998 99 2000 01 Cumulative
von Hagen and Brückner –0.9 –0.1 –1.4 –0.1 –2.5
OECD –0.2 +0.3 –0.3 –0.3 –0.5
Note: Negative numbers denote expansion.
Over the four years 1998–2001, the OECD indicates a structural loosening of 
0.5 percent of GDP compared with the authors’ estimate of 2.5 percent of GDP. There
is no clear right or wrong answer here in terms of the approach, but the difference in the
estimates again highlights the considerable uncertainty. It would certainly be useful to
compare the methods over a longer period. It would also be interesting to review some
of the authors’ econometric results using the OECD cyclical adjustment technique in
order to confirm that the adjustment is not conditioning the other conclusions.Von Hagen and Brückner end their paper by noting that “consolidation fatigue” is
setting in and that winning support for further fiscal consolidation in a low-growth
environment is proving difficult. As they note, the real challenge is to raise under-
lying productivity growth in Europe through further structural reforms. The authors
argue that the fiscal rules are getting in the way—for example, by eliminating the
scope to pursue reform programs that necessitate higher initial deficits, albeit with
lower medium-term ones. More work in this area would be very welcome, as some
reforms, for example, to increase work incentives by changes in benefit systems,
would not appear to run foul of this critique.
To conclude, I think the paper is very interesting and raises much food for
thought and further analysis. Any analysis of European Economic and Monetary
Union is inevitably hampered by the lack of data to date. Many conclusions remain
open. The authors should be commended for attempting a rigorous study that sets
out a useful route for further work as time progresses.
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Most of Jürgen von Hagen and Matthias Brückner’s findings are plausible and
deserve support. This goes, in particular, for their conclusion that the experienceregarding monetary policy since the start of the European Monetary Union (EMU)
has been more encouraging than with regard to fiscal policies. However, also in the
area of monetary policy, the first three and a half years of EMU give rise to a number 
of concerns:
(1) Due to the well-known time lags in the transmission process of monetary 
policy, the observed relatively low inflation rates in the euro area prevailing
during the first 12 to 18 months after entry into EMU have to be attributed
largely to the previous policy regime of the Bundesbank, which was de facto in
charge of European monetary policy until the start of EMU. This means that
since the point in time at which price developments in the euro area can be
related to the policy measures taken by the European Central Bank (ECB), the
actual inflation rate, measured in terms of the harmonized consumer price
index (HCPI), has been persistently above 2 percent, the upper bound of the
ECB’s definition of price stability over the medium term. Also worrying has
been the gradual rise in core inflation, which may be indicative of underlying
pressures gaining momentum. Should the ECB continue to miss its self-
imposed target, it could be faced with a credibility problem—irrespective of
the fact that the actual inflation rate has been strongly influenced by a number
of external shocks, notably the rise in oil prices. If such a sequence of 
“temporary” factors lasts long enough, it could become entrenched in Europe’s
underlying inflation rate and give rise to an increase in inflation expectations.
Until now, however, this has not been the case, as inflation expectations
implied by the pricing of inflation-indexed bonds and the recent rise of the
euro against other major currencies appear to suggest.
(2) Part of the explanation why consumer price index (CPI) inflation has been
overshooting the ECB’s target range is the fact that economic developments in
the euro area have continued to show significant divergences. This applies, in
particular, to the growth performance of euro-area member countries and to 
different cyclical patterns. Some of the inflationary pressures in the euro area
appear to reflect the fact that slow-growing countries have been experiencing 
a relatively sticky inflation rate and, hence, have not generated sufficient 
disinflation to offset the rise in inflation in the fast-growing ones. Under these
conditions, it has been difficult for the ECB to push average CPI inflation in
the euro area below the upper limit of its target range. A number of ECB
observers have suggested, therefore, that the target is too ambitious and should
be revised upward to take account of these difficulties. In more general terms, it
can be said that asymmetries and divergences in inflation developments among
member countries raise additional problems for the conduct of the common
monetary policy. Such problems can best be addressed by structural reforms
aiming at raising the growth potential of countries that are lagging behind.
(3) Another problem relates to the ECB’s “two-pillar” strategy. The first pillar is
defined as a “reference value” for the annual growth rate of the broad 
monetary aggregate, M3. Since entry into EMU, M3 has grown at a rate
consistently higher than the reference value set by the ECB, except for a short
period at the end of 2000/beginning of 2001. Given the medium-term link
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Commentbetween money growth and inflation in the euro area von Hagen and Brückner
are referring to, their conclusion that the stance of monetary policy was too easy
in 1999 and 2000 and that the resurgence of inflation in the euro area since 
the start of EMU must be attributed at least in part to the high money growth
rates tolerated by the ECB appears prima facie correct.The ECB argues that a 
number of temporary factors have distorted M3 developments. Even if one 
follows this argument, the longer the ECB leaves interest rates unchanged while
M3 growth exceeds its preset reference value, the more the ECB’s two-pillar
strategy will come under pressure, giving renewed stimulation to public 
discussion about the relative importance of the two pillars. While the two-pillar
strategy offers a high degree of flexibility, it also entails a considerable amount
of ambiguity and, hence, communication difficulties.
My conclusions arising from these considerations are similar to those drawn 
by von Hagen and Brückner: the ECB should be less concerned about short-term
cyclical prospects and about the degree of capacity utilization in the euro area. Given
that long-run monetary relations continue to be stable as observed by the authors,
the ECB should give adequate weight to monetary developments in its decision-
making process.
Von Hagen and Brückner’s assessment that on the fiscal side the picture during
the first years of EMU is more mixed deserves support. However, some of the 
arguments the authors put forward for substantiating this judgment need to be 
qualified. Moreover, other factors that also explain the less satisfactory experience
with fiscal policies in EMU are not mentioned.
(1) The authors’ finding that small countries typically pay more attention to the
strictures of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) appears to have been 
confirmed by recent events. A cause for concern is, above all, the expenditure
drift in the three largest euro-area economies. If other member countries follow
this behavior, the SGP could be rapidly undermined, with corresponding 
consequences for the functioning of EMU. The obvious conclusion for a
reform of the budgetary procedures of the European Union (EU) is to shift the
axis of power in economic policymaking by strengthening the role of the EU
Commission and reducing the role of the national governments. Unfortunately,
driven by member states’ desire to “move from technocracy to democracy,” the
actual development goes rather in the opposite direction. Also, the authors’
accurate observation that the fiscal rules introduced by EMU did not prevent
member states from relaxing fiscal discipline after the decision on EMU 
membership had been taken is less the result of inappropriate rules than the
consequence of inherent weaknesses in the institutional arrangements. In 
particular, the fact that “sinners sit in judgment of other sinners” has made
enforcement of the rules difficult.
(2) The authors’ assertion that fiscal policy has been procyclical in the first years of
EMU deserves some qualification. First, while automatic fiscal stabilizers can
make some contribution to smoothing cyclical fluctuations, only EU member
countries that had not already achieved a fiscal position in balance or in surplus
were prevented from letting the automatic stabilizers operate fully. This effect,
162 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/DECEMBER 2002however, was exactly what the fathers of the SGP had in mind when designing
the pact: the objective of reaching as quickly as possible a balanced budget was
considered more important than preserving fiscal room of maneuver for 
countries still running sizeable deficits. Second, it is often assumed that a 
loosening of fiscal policy has expansionary effects on the economy, at least in
the short term. In practice and under the conditions prevailing in the EU, 
the influence of fiscal policy on macroeconomic activity is uncertain, state-
dependent, and generally small, and should therefore not be overestimated.
This applies especially to an active anti-cyclical strategy by means of a 
discretionary fiscal policy that has additional well-known drawbacks.
(3) Von Hagen and Brückner also argue that the current fiscal framework is
incomplete, because it does not give EMU member states enough guidance 
for the choice of a successful fiscal strategy. However, it should be stressed 
that the fiscal framework of the Maastricht Treaty was designed not to 
provide a framework for an optimal fiscal strategy under all circumstances 
but rather to provide safeguards against fiscal excesses to protect the common
monetary policy. Insofar as the current fiscal framework respects the 
principles of the Maastricht Treaty, it leaves fiscal policy in the competence 
of individual member states and leaves the rights of national parliaments
largely untouched.
In summing up, it should be stated that the fiscal rules created by EMU are not
perfect but appropriate enough to allow for the proper functioning of EMU. The
true risks derive from the inhibitions of national governments to fully implement the
agreed rules. Several European governments have been calling for a “reinterpretation”
of the SGP, ranging from applying the rules of the pact only to the EU as a whole 
(as opposed to individual member countries) to using cyclically adjusted figures
instead of nominal figures, and/or to excluding certain expenditure categories from
the calculation of the fiscal deficits. In the most recent instance, some governments
have even made their commitment to further fiscal consolidation subject to achieving
certain growth objectives. All these explicit and implicit calls for an “SGP Lite”
amount to a weakening of the pact. This could undermine confidence and in the end




Responding to the comments of the discussants, Jürgen von Hagen stated that 
uncertainty has been taken into account in applying the Taylor rule by using various
specifications to check the robustness of empirical results. He also emphasized the
role of money supply in providing a guideline for medium- to long-term prices. On
fiscal issues, von Hagen commented that his basic results would not be altered by 
the use of alternative data, and that he was not arguing for the implementation of
procyclical fiscal policy during an economic downturn as would be required under
strict fiscal discipline.In the general discussion, Pierre van der Haegen argued that actual policy 
decisions were based on a wide range of relevant available information, including that
related to money supply variables, and that the Taylor rule, which does not assign
monetary aggregates any roles in policymaking, cannot be used as a benchmark to
assess the past record of the European Central Bank (ECB). Angel Palerm raised
doubts about the stability of the inflation-unemployment relationship in Europe and
stressed that without a stable Phillips curve the Taylor rule may not provide an 
adequate basis for comparative evaluations of monetary policy before and after the
introduction of the euro. Palerm and Gabriele Galati pointed out that changes have
occurred in the transmission channel of monetary policies as a result of the launch of
the European Monetary Union (EMU). In light of these structural changes, they
urged caution in using the Taylor rule in comparative evaluations.
Palerm and Masahiro Kawai (Ministry of Finance, Japan) both pointed out that
the impact of interest rates on aggregate demand and the degree of synchronization
of a region’s business cycles would differ according to the level of economic integra-
tion, and cast doubt on the justification of comparative evaluations based on the
Taylor rule and the different evaluation results. Von Hagen responded to these points
as follows. While it is too early to judge the degree of synchronicity of the region’s
business cycles, if major lags do in fact exist in these business cycles among member
countries, then the results of the analysis should be on the mark because the analysis
focuses on the major countries in terms of policy management, such as Germany and
France. In this context, Palerm raised the question of whether the ECB’s 2 percent
inflation ceiling was too low in light of the incomplete integration of the goods 
markets and the continued inflation rate differentials among EMU countries.
Regarding the monetary policy of the ECB, van der Haegen welcomed some of
the results offered by von Hagen because they emphasize the importance of money
supply, a key component of the ECB’s “two-pillar” strategy. Roberto Rinaldi (Banca
d’Italia) addressed the policy action taken in early 2001, which has been interpreted
as a measure toward monetary tightening by von Hagen, and asked how this could be
consistent with the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) interpretation that this
action represented monetary easing. Von Hagen argued that, at least in terms of
money supply, the policy action of early 2001 represented monetary tightening.
Citing Germany’s high real interest rates and the views of market participants,
Rinaldi then questioned the assertion that the economic situation of Germany had
been emphasized in the ECB’s policy.
Regarding fiscal policy, van der Haegen agreed with von Hagen’s statement that
the credibility of fiscal policy commitments had an important bearing on confidence
in the EMU. Rinaldi also expressed his agreement with von Hagen’s analysis. On the
other hand, Maurice Obstfeld argued that it was necessary to mention the empirical
literature on the importance of the structure of fiscal revenues and expenditures. As a
rationale for procyclical fiscal policies, Obstfeld argued that in addition to political
factors, there were certain economic factors which arose from the mutual interaction
of fiscal discipline. On the question of how to improve fiscal discipline, von Hagen
argued that while the fiscal authorities of member countries should be given more
164 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/DECEMBER 2002discretion, the European Commission should be given the right to comment on the
fiscal status of member countries.
Han Ming Zhi asked what the implications of the experiences of European Union
(EU) integration were for Asian countries, which were in a very different stage of 
economic development.
In closing the session, Chairperson Jorge A. Braga de Macedo mentioned the 
importance of structural reform in the EMU member countries and argued that the
European experience presented other regions with the following two lessons: (1) the
European experience shows that economic integration is time consuming, although
the Americas and Asia might not need 50 years to achieve it; and (2) it is important for
the institutions involved in economic policy management to engage in cooperation
and coordination on the international and regional levels.
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